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ii 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Petitioner and Appellee Deanna Pugh, pro se, certifies this Petition 
for Rehearing is submitted in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
I hereby submit the following arguments and facts for this Court's review 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Respondent and Appellant Dr. Dozzo-Hughes ("Wife") bases her 
case to disinter my son, Curtis Hughes, upon a statement in a note my son 
left to me, his mother. Dr. Dozzo-Hughes, however, gave testimony at the 
trial court level challenging the authenticity of the very note that she relies 
upon to disinter my son. In addition, Dr. Dozzo-Hughes acknowledged that 
the very wish she seeks to fulfill cannot legally be honored. This Court 
remanded the case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to 
basically determine whether waiver occurred in this case, noting that neither 
party challenged the authenticity of the note. It is my argument that waiver 
is immaterial in this case because the wish the widow seeks to accomplish 
cannot legally be performed nor is it compelling to disturb my son's remains 
upon a note the proponent herself believes has been altered. The basic 
determining factor in every exhumation case is that there must be a 
compelling reason to disinter. Dr. Dozzo-Hughes does not provide a 
compelling reason to disinter; therefore, the issue of waiver is immaterial in 
this case. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. I: The Proponent of the Note, Dr. Dozzo-Hughes, Did in 
Fact Challenge the Authenticity of the Note. 
This Court, in its opinion filed on May 5,2005, under Footnote 2, 
stated: "On appeal, the parties do not dispute the Note's Authenticity." 
This Court, under paragraph 25, also stated the following: "Furthermore, 
even though the trial court was required to assume that the Note contained 
Decedent's wishes, it ruled that the Note was 'not material' to its decision, 
stating '[Wife]' has not given evidence that the [N]ote creates a binding, 
enforceable legal obligation to accomplish a cremation.'" 
I now petition this Court to review the trial court's ruling and this 
Court's own ruling with the specific knowledge that Dr. Dozzo-Hughes 
herself testified that she doubts the authenticity of the Note and that this 
information was presented to this Court on appeal in my Brief of Appellee 
as well as at the oral argument. In the Brief of Appellee, on page 6, under 
"Statement of the Case," and again on p. 32, under "Issue No. 5," it was 
brought to this Court's attention that Dr. Dozzo-Hughes challenged the 
authenticity of the note. In fact, Dr. Dozzo-Hughes gave the following 
testimony at her deposition taken on January 31,2003: 
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"[BYMR.FARRIS:] 
Q. Do you have any doubt as to the authenticity of 
this Exhibit 1, this letter? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What do you doubt about it? You don't think 
Curtis authored it? 
A. I believe that this handwriting here is 
Curtis', but when you look at the typeset and the 
different fonts and things like that, I believe the 
note has been altered. But because I was not 
allowed to read the note in full, I don't know 
what might have been altered. 
(See attached Addendum A-1, condensed pages 122-125 of Deposition of 
Dr. Dozzo-Hughes taken on January SI, 2003, highlighting page 123, 
line 25, through page 124, lines 1-10; see also Record Index 1196.) 
It is my position that Judge Beacham, for purposes of summary 
judgment in this case, did view the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to Dr. Dozzo-Hughes. Given 
Dr. Dozzo-Hughes' own testimony challenging the authenticity of the note 
and testifying that it is her belief that the note has been altered at the trial 
court level, as shown in Addendum A-l, this Court and Judge Beacham 
have the duty to view the note as not authentic and as a note that has 
possibly been altered, based upon the non-moving party's own testimony. 
Further, when testimony had been given by the Wife challenging the 
authenticity of the note prior to summary judgment, the Wife cannot simply 
create new testimony to preclude summary judgment. Under Rule 56(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it states as follows: 
" . . . . The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
(emphasis added) Again, this Court, under paragraph 25, stated 
the following: "Furthermore, even though the trial court was required to 
assume that the Note contained Decedent's wishes, it ruled that the Note 
was 'not material' to its decision, stating '[Wife] has not given evidence that 
the [NJote creates a binding, enforceable legal obligation to accomplish a 
cremation.'" Wasn't the trial court required to assume that the Note had 
been altered and possibly wasn't even authentic given the Wife's testimony 
at her deposition? 
The motion for summary judgment presented to Judge Beacham that 
ultimately was granted by the trial court made no mention of the note, and 
the non-moving party did not provide the trial court with any evidence 
suggesting the note was authentic or that the note contained Curtis's wishes. 
Had the Wife in her memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment or in her affidavit supporting her memorandum in opposition to 
4 
the motion attached the note and testified to its authenticity, I would have 
opposed this evidence by addressing the Wife's deposition testimony 
wherein she challenges the authenticity of the note. Judge Beacham in this 
case was not presented with the note by the Wife to weigh as material 
evidence, but he chose to address the note in his ruling even though neither 
party produced it for purposes of supporting or opposing summary 
judgment. In addition, for this Court's information, Dr. Dozzo-Hughes' 
deposition testimony challenging the authenticity of the note was taken one 
month after the evidentiary hearing was conducted by the first trial court 
judge, the Honorable James L. Shumate. 
How could it be compelling to disinter my son based upon a note 
when the proponent of the note challenges its authenticity? 
ISSUE NO. II: The Trial Court and Dr. Dozzo-Hughes Acknowledged 
That Fulfillment of Curtis's Wishes in the Note Would 
Be Illegal in New Mexico and Therefore Dr. Dozzo-
Hughes Would Not Be Able to Fulfill His Wish 
Legally. 
On September 9, 2003, Judge Beacham heard oral argument on both 
parties' motions for summary judgment. I now draw this Court's attention 
to oral argument made by Mr. William O. Kimball, the Wife's attorney, in 
opposition to my motion for summary judgment on September 9, 2003. As 
shown on page 68 of Volume II of the transcribed hearing, Mr. Kimball 
stated the following: "I know that, in New Mexico, that - 1 don't believe 
you can put ashes in the - or at the Rio Grande River. And we'd try to 
honor that as much as possible, maybe a cemetery nearby or something to 
that effect." (See attached Addendum A-2, with p. 68, lines 2-5, 
highlighted; see also Record Index p. 1199.) Judge Beacham, on page 10, 
paragraph (e), of his Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment dated 
October 28, 2003, points out the following: "Respondent acknowledges 
that she cannot fully comply with what she considers Mr. Hughes's wishes 
even if the body is disinterred and cremated, because laws governing the 
Rio Grande River would prevent her from spreading the ashes there." (See 
attached Addendum A-3, Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment dated 
October 28, 2003; see also Record Index p. 860.) 
Viewing the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the Wife 
in this case does not create a compelling reason to disinter my son so that 
the Wife can place his ashes in "maybe a cemetery nearby or something to 
that effect." If you view the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom, the 
Wife will have my son's body exhumed and cremated in order to place his 
ashes somewhere near the Rio Grande River over three years after burial in 
order to comply with a note my son left to me, a note the Wife does not 
believe is authentic. 
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ISSUE NO. Ill: The Issue of Waiver in This Case is Immaterial Since 
the Wish Cannot Be Legally Honored and Therefore 
the Note Provides No Compelling Reason To Disinter. 
In this case the Honorable G. Rand Beacham was not persuaded that 
the Wife had identified any compelling reason to order Mr. Hughes's body 
disinterred. In addition, throughout this appeal, the Wife did not 
specifically challenge the trial court's determination there was no 
compelling reason to disinter but merely challenged the issue of waiver. As 
shown in the case of In re Estate of Mover, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978) and in 
all the other exhumation cases throughout the United States, the first and 
foremost issue to be considered in cases of disinterment is whether or not a 
compelling reason exists to disinter. 
While the Utah Supreme Court made an additional determination of 
waiver in the Mover case, the majority of exhumation cases do not address 
the issue of waiver but merely consider other factors revolving around the 
disinterment request, ultimately determining whether or not a compelling 
reason exists to disinter. While it is my position waiver occurred in this 
case, I argue that it is not necessary to remand this case to factually 
determine whether or not waiver occurred. I argue that the law set forth in 
the exhumation cases cited in this case by both parties requires a compelling 
reason to disinter only. However, if the court were to determine a 
compelling reason exists, which this trial court did not, then the issue of 
waiver would become paramount to its decision-making process* Waiver is 
an important issue to be considered in opposition to disinterment, especially 
if there may be a compelling reason to disinter. If, on the other hand, the 
deceased's wishes cannot legally be honored or if the person seeking 
disinterment offers no compelling reason to disinter, then the issue of 
waiver becomes immaterial. 
This Court ruled under Footnote 9 as follows: " However, that 
policy has to be considered in relation to the facts to be found by the trial 
court after receiving testimony and evidence from the parties." The trial 
court received evidence and testimony from the Wife that offered no 
compelling reason to disinter. The Wife testified that the note upon which 
she relies has been altered and doubts its authenticity, and the Wife also 
argues that it is against New Mexico law to spread my son's ashes in the 
Rio Grande River and therefore would place his ashes somewhere near 
there. If the note had been offered as evidence of mv son's wishes to the 
trial court and if the Wife succeeded in proving its authenticity, my son's 
wish was not to be exhumed and cremated over three years later, nor was it 
my son's wish to have his ashes placed somewhere near the Rio Grande 
River. In essence, the Wife is seeking a judicial order to allow her to honor 
ft 
my son's alleged wishes, to allow her to disobey the law. There is no 
compelling reason to disinter; therefore, waiver is an immaterial issue in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the fact that the Wife testified that she doubts the 
authenticity of the note, that she believes the note has been altered, and that 
it would be illegal to place my son's cremated remains in the Rio Grande 
River, I respectfully request this Court reconsider its remand of this matter 
to the trial court for another evidentiary hearing. I respectfully request this 
Court reconsider the issue of waiver as it relates to this case, and that this 
Court uphold the Honorable G. Rand Beacham's ruling that there is no 
compelling reason to disinter my son. Please let him rest in peace. 
DATED: June I1/ ,2005. 
EANNAPUGH 
Petitioner and Appellee Pro Se 
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The Deposition of I^Ke Dozzo-Hugws, PhJX IN RE: PUGH v. DOZZO-HUGHK 
Taken on 1/31/2003 
I Page 
j 1 bersoimicli," whytbatwassoin^rtantontliatday, 
I 2 on March 6&, that I cxmldn't get a copy of it 
I 3 My God, my husband said he loved mc and these 
1 4 peopk withheld that from roe. 
1 5 Q, You read the second paragraph? 
6 A. Yes. 
j 7 Q. As^Soiflieie^alsoscm^iiandwi^Hig^a 
I 8 handwritten-actually,tfwecouMlabdit,there's 
j 9 a fii^ full paragraph, second fufl paragi^ 
110 one-sentence third paragnn^ 
i l l paragraph, and then some handwriting, 
112 Did you read all of paragraph 2? 
] 13 A. No. 
J14 Q, How far did you get? 
115 A . "Because I love hex so HHICIL" She pointed 
116 She handed this back to me and she pointed at me where 
117 I was to read. 
118 Q. Middte o f the paragraph 2. 
119 A . Yes. And then she took the no te away from rne 
120 again. I dio^ 11 read anythir^ arxmt any houses. I 
J21 didn^ know anything about anything. Then after she 
j 22 ripped the note out of my hands the secor^ 
123 o^ughter, Stacy, started talking a rx>ut the Beck and 
124 Balconhonies,andI^verycoTinisedbecaxiseIhaven^ 
j 25 read this, and the Balcon home was rninebefo^ 
1 Pfcgc 
I 1 maxrierl 
j 2 Q. Tlafs the one you were living in? 
1 3 A. Yes. 
1 4 Q. Ihafs the place where the jumping jack was? 
1 5 A. Yes. So I don't know what Deanna and Stacy are 
6 talking about, because I ha ven^ read tte 
7 s o -
1 8 Q, What happens then? 
1 9 A I beheve that these people are going to be 
110 close to me and be hone^ with n« and ^ aie with nae 
i l l and let rj^ be close to them and us come together as a 
112 family, because it took this tragedy to finally get us 
113 together. That's what I believed 
114 Q. T i e n dM they leave? Did you leave? 
115 A . They feft the warehouse and went back to Utah. 
116 Q. Steve remains? 
117 A 1 donft remember. 
118 Q. D o yoa have airy—subsequendy,youVehada 
119 chaiKXtoieadfi»a^iEeiiote^ttefe^eoii?e^ 
20 A. Yes. 
121 Q. Wl i emSdyaa first have that opportunity? 
122 A Last summer. 
123 Q. I)o you rememrjexappiOAiniately when? 
124 A. July or August 
125 Q. Doywlnw my riouhtas totfac inHuilprf 
2 J P*gel24 
1 1 ibis Exhibit 1, tins letter* 
I 2 A. Yts,Ido. 
1 3 Q. What do you doubt about it? You don't dank 
I 4 Curtis authored it? 
j 5 A I believe that this handwriting here is I 
I 6 Curtis^ but when you look at the typeset and the 
1 7 different fonts and tilings lite 
I 8 note has been altered But because I was not allowed 
I 9 to read the note in full, I don f^cooir what migk have 
110 been altered 
111 Q. Have you looked for ~ do you k n o w - - h o w many 
112 computers did you have? 
j 13 A Tve looked through every c^rnputer that Colitis 
114 had access to. j 
115 Q. AadfiOTid-
j 16 A No. I 
117 Q. Did he have a typewriter? I 
118 A Idoo^ know. Curtis took many o f his 1 
119 r^longings and gave thern to his family m e m ^ I 
120 Q- Whendidhedothat? 
121 A I don11 know. I 
122 Q. How did you discover that? I 
123 A. Every once in awhile you go through the house j 
124 and you notice something's gone. I 
125 Q, Like? 
J j Page 125 
I 1 A. A bread maker. 
I 2 Q. Who has the bread maker? 
J 3 A. I have no idea. 
| 4 Q„ Youjust know ifs gone? j 5 A. Ye*. 
j 6 Q, How do you know it went to his family? What 
I 7 rnakesyoususrx^ that it went to his family? 
I 8 A, Because rus truck was loaded down with things 
I 9 and— 
j 10 Q. Is this the day where Hofiys things were in 
111 the back ofhis truck or is this a d i ^ ^ 
112 A Iliere are two trucks, the Budget truck and I 
113 CurtisT truck. 
114 Q. W h k h i s t h e t m c k t h a t h e h a d H o U y s 
115 belongings in? 
J16 A. His truck. 
j 17 Q. And youte saying there was bekragings in the 
118 Budget truck? 
j 19 A. Yes. 
120 Q. When had he loaded those into the Budget truck? 
121 A. I have no idea. 
122 Q. When did you discover he had belongings in the 
123 Budget track? 
124 A. After he died 
125 Q. How did you discover that? 
32 (Pages 122 to 125) 
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SHEET 17 PAGE 67 
1 finally got a copy of the note from Mrs. Pugh. 
2 Now, they're going to bring up that MR. Pugh, or 
3 the petitioner, showed part of the note to my dent, which 
4 is true, Your Honor. She showed her the first paragraph, or 
5 part of the first sentence, then yanked the note away and 
6 pointed her to a certain section that says, Tlove you," 
7 and there's certain terms regarding my dient 
8 Now, shedidnt know he wanted to be cremated 
9 unS she received a copy of the noteduring the summerof 
110 2002. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. But none of this establishes 
12 any teg^ baas for the Court to make an order regardmg 
13 that It explains your client's preference as in the 
14 reasons for her current request or current intBition. But 
15 that ctoesn't establish her right to do that Andthafswhy 
16 I use the cannon and the Bering Strate idea. 
17 MR. KIMBALL: I understand, Your Honor. Theoniy 
118 reason I was bringing that up is to help the Court 
119 understand that rny client isnt ddng this out of spite or 
20 o n a w l m This is very important to her. I n f e c t s 
21 beenveryeriKJtkmaitydan^ngtoher. toddy's 
22 essentially just trying to honor the wishes of her deceased 
23 husband, at a great expense. And it's our position, Your 
24 Honor, that, under New Mexico law, the respondent can honor 
125 to- husband's - her dteceased husband's v^ies for bureif to 
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the extent allowable by the law. 
I know that, in New Mexico, that - 1 dont 
believe you can put ashes in the - or at the Rio Grande 
River. And we'd try to honor that as much as possible, 
maybe a cemetery nearby or something to that effect. But-
and they're going to bring up the Smart case, Your Honor. 
In the Smart case, it's completely different than 
the present case. This person died, I believe had been \ 
person, and the dergy person had a ( 
will. AndsThrwas aware tliatiTirpa^Snwanted to be 
buried a certain way, wanted to be cremated in this case. 
And after the death, he didn't exerdse that authority, he -
well, its in<fispute still. But he knew of that desire and 
he didn't honor it And the court found that the body 
shouldn't be interred - it shouldn't be taken out of the 
ground again because this person was aware, as the executor, 
that the person wanted to be cremated, that the decedent 
wanted to be cremated in the Smart v. Moyer case. 
And thafs essentially, besides the statute 
enacted on May 5th, 2003, this is the only Utah law that is 
renrctely on the subject In this case, it's a spouse frying 
to honor the wishes, Your Honor. And, again, she wasnt 
aware of what he wanted to take place. She didn't find out 
until the summer of 2002 that he wanted to be cremated and 
gxead over a river. And she feels really very wronged, 
68 
PAGE 69 
1 Your Honor, because that was held back from her as a spouse. 
2 THE COURT: Well, let's put something eke on the 
3 table. Considering the subject matter, ¥$ difficult to be 
4 indelicate about this but, frankly, this only makes a 
5 difference to your client There could be no evidence that 
6 it matters at all to the decedent anymore. Itdidatone 
7 time, perhaps, but there's not going to be any evidence 
8 beyond that 
9 Your dient did what she was satisfied with at the 
110 beginning; now she's not satisfied with it But its really 
11 her own discomfort thafs involved here, isnt it? There's 
112 nothing else at stake. 
13 MR.KIMBALL: Your Honor, the decedents daughter 
14 who is also located in Now Mexico and his ex-wife, who is 
15 somewhat close, also has an interest. And she was named in 
116 here, but she hasnt been part of this litigation process. 
17 But, yeah, they want-they want the body to slay 
18 here, Your Honor, the decedents parents, the ablings want 
19 the body to stay here. However, under statutory l a w -
20 THECOURT: Well, but they're not the o n e s -
21 t teyrenottheonesto-^iggest ingtoerebe-bea 
22 change. Thafs my point. But for your clients discomfort 
23 because of a late-discovered note of some sort, there 
124 wouldn't be anything going on here. 
125 MR. KIMBALL: You're correct, Your Honor. Had she 
69 
PAGE 70 
1 known about his wishes, its our positfon she would have 
2 honored his wishes, as the spouse and as the statute allows 
3 hertodo. 
4 THECOURT: Right 
5 MR. KIMBALL: And so as -
6 THECOURT: But shedidnt know about it. 
7 MR. KIMBALL: She didn't 
8 THECOURT: And its hard for me to understand 
9 what the motivation is, then, to go on. Its simply a "wish 
10 Td have done that." But, jeez, I wish I'd done a lot of 
11 things when I didn't know something that I later learned. 
12 We all do that And thafs ailed life. Things happen, we 
13 deal with them at the time, we later learn more and we look 
14 back and say, "Well, I wish I'd done that differently." 
15 But arent we just dealing with something like 
16 that for your dient? 
17 MR.WMBALL: Its a little more than that, Your 
18 Honor. She was deceived. They kept the knowledge from her. 
19 It was kind of a family conspiracy, its our position, and 
20 tha t -
21 THECOURT: Well, what evidence is there of that? 
22 MR. KIMBALL: Well, we haven't got into that 
23 because its still our position, Your Honor, that the law 
24 allows her to do this as the spouse. 
25 THECOURT: Okay. I see. 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA PUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LESLIE DOZZO-HUGHES, et al, 
Respondents.) 
) RULING ON MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 020502154 
) Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to motions for summary judgment filed 
by Petitioner Deanna Pugh (hereafter "Petitioner") and Respondent Leslie Dozzo-Hughes 
(hereafter "Respondent"). The Court heard oral arguments at a hearing on September 9, 
2003, and i&structed the parties thereafter to submit courtesy copies of their memoranda and 
affidavits, copies of relevant case law, and a notice to submit for decision. Having read the 
memoranda, statutes and case law, having heard the arguments, and having reviewed the file 
for this action, the Court rules as follows: 
COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4-501 
Respondent's motion was filed first. The "Statement of Facts" of Respondent's 
supporting memorandum cites only one source: Portions of the "Background" section of 
Judge Shumate's May 19,2003 "Ruling onRule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment" 
Although Respondent treats the "Background" section as if it consisted of findings of fact, 
that is incorrect. The "Background" section appears to tins Court to be simply a recitation 
of the allegations relevant to the issues raised by the pleadings. It is particularly telling that 
the "Background" statements upon which Respondent relies are irrelevant to Judge 
Shumate's actual ruling that the Order Granting Permanent Injunction was vacated. 
Consequently, Respondent's motion for summary judgment lacks a sufficient factual basis. 
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is supported by a memorandum with a 
"Statement of Facts" in proper form and with clear references to the record of this case. 
Petitioner has complied with Rule 4-501 for a supporting memorandum. Petitioner also 
styled her memorandum as one opposing Respondent's motion, however, and in this regard 
it fails to meet the requirements of Rule 4-501.l If Respondent's memorandum had complied 
with the rule, Respondent's statements of fact would have been deemed admitted for 
purposes of summary judgment. See, e.g., Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App 291. 
Respondent's memorandum in opposition to Petitioner's motion did identify the 
paragraphs of Petitioner's statement of facts which Respondent disputes. Respondent's 
original formal error was corrected in her post-hearing reply memorandum. The specific 
disputes identified in Respondent's memorandum, however, consist mainly of argument and 
immaterial facts and are not sufficient to raise any particular genuine issue of material fact. 
lrThis is a common problem when parties file competing motions for summary judgment. In an 
effort to be efficient, the parties file dual-purpose memoranda which, in spite of best intentions, are 
inevitably inadequate for one purpose or the other. This Court cannot recall ever seeing a memorandum 
which adequately constituted both a supporting memorandum and an opposing memorandum. 
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Petitioner's reply memorandum correctly notes many of these deficiencies. 
As a result, the facts which this Court finds to have been adequately presented are 
taken primarily from Petitioner's supporting memorandum, with some additions from 
Respondent's reply memorandum. 
FACTS 
Some of the facts asserted by the parties, and properly supported, are irrelevant to the 
Court's decision; for example, the Court finds no relevance in the fact that each party paid 
for the services of the mortuary hired by that party. The Court finds that the following 
relevant and material facts have been established without genuine issue: 
1. Petitioner is the mother of Mr. Curtis Hughes, who died on February 28,2002 
in Albuquerque, New Mexico of cyanide poisoning, an apparent suicide. 
2. Respondent is the surviving spouse of Mr. Hughes, and had been married to 
him about 11 months before his death.2 
3. On February 12,2002, Mr. Hughes left a voice mail message for Respondent 
in which he said he was going to kill himself and that he would like to be cremated and have 
his ashes spread over the Rio Grande River. 
4. Mr. Hughes phoned Respondent again about a half hour later, and stated that 
2There was a suggestion in the arguments that Respondent and Mr. Hughes were separated and not 
on good terms at the time of his death, but neither party's memorandum established such facts. 
^ 
he did not mean what he said; Respondent, who is a mental health professional,3 interpreted 
Mr. Hughes's two phone calls to be "a ploy to get attention," such as she commonly 
encounters in her profession. 
5. After Mr. Hughes's death on February 28,2002, Respondent hired French's 
Mortuary to receive the body from the Medical Examiner's Office in Albuquerque. On 
about March 2, 2002, French's Mortuary took charge of the body under Respondent's 
instructions to prepare the body and have a funeral service for Mr. Hughes in Albuquerque. 
6. At about the same time, Petitioner hired Metcalf Mortuary to transport the 
body from Albuquerque to St. George, Utah for a second funeral service and the interment 
in a burial plot there. Respondent consented to the Utah funeral and interment. 
7. A funeral service was held in Albuquerque on March 5, 2002, after which 
Respondent allowed the body to be taken to Utah by Metcalf Mortuary for the second funeral 
service and burial, which were conducted on March 8, 2002 and were attended by 
Respondent. Respondent gave no indication that she thought the burial in Utah was to be 
temporary. 
8. At the time of his death, Mr. Hughes apparently left a note for Petitioner, 
making some reference to being cremated and having his ashes spread over the Rio Grande 
3Neither party's statement of facts covers this fact, but the Court has gathered this from their 
discussion. 
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River in accordance with his voice mail message to Respondent.4 
ANALYSIS 
Respondent seeks the Courts order allowing her to have the body disinterred and 
transported back to New Mexico for cremation, asserting that she is certain that this was Mr. 
Hughes's wish. Respondent apparently relies upon Mr. Hughes's voice mail message, which 
she did not believe at the time, and upon Mr. Hughes's note, the contents of which are not 
in evidence before the Court. 
1. Funeral Services Licensing Act. 
Respondent argues that she alone is entitled to determine whether the body will be 
disinterred, under the authority of Utah Code Ann. §58-9-602. This statutory provision is 
part of the current version of the Funeral Services Licensing Act (hereafter the "Act*') which 
first became effective May 5,2003, more than one year after the subject burial, and it now 
sets the priorities of persons who are vested with the "right and duty to control the 
disposition of a deceased person/' The earlier version of the Act, which was effective at the 
time of the subject burial, had no comparable provision. 
Respondent argues that the new provisions of the Act should be applied retroactively, 
but the Act does not so provide. In the absence of an express declaration of retroactivity, 
4The parties disagree about when Respondent first saw the note, but the Court finds this to be 
immaterial to the Court's decision. In fact, neither party has given the Court a copy of the note or the 
details of its contents. 
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statutes are not to be applied retroactively. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3. Furthermore, the 
Court knows of no basis for concluding that the absence of a comparable provision in the 
former Act evinces a legislative intention that the new Act be applied retroactively. 
Consequently, Respondent's argument is not persuasive. 
Furthermore, die Court is not persuaded that Section 602 of the Act would be 
controlling in this case even if it applied retroactively. Section 602 specifically controls the 
"right and duty to control the disposition of a deceased person." "Disposition" is defined in 
the Act as "the final disposal of a dead human body" by any of six specific means or "other 
lawful means." Utah Code Ann. §58-9-102(7). Both "earth intermenf' and "cremation" are 
defined as means of "disposition," but nothing in the Act indicates that Section 602 gives any 
person a continuing or perpetual right to choose more than one disposition of one body. 
Consequently, the Court is not persuaded that the serial dispositions sought by Respondent 
are authorized by the Act, even in its current form. 
2. New Mexico Law. 
Respondent argues that the Court should apply the law of New Mexico to determine 
that she has a right to disinter the body from Utah and dispose of it in New Mexico. The 
argument that New Mexico law gave Respondent rights to the original disposition of the 
body would likely have been correct if made before the body was interred in Utah, but now 
it is too late. The issue is no longer whether Respondent had such rights regarding 
disposition. The issue is whether Respondent can now obtain permission for disinterment 
from a grave in Utah, and Utah clearly has the most significant relationship to that issue. 
Disinterment of a body from a grave in Utah is a matter for Utah law. See, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. §26-2-17, §26-4-12, and §76-9-704. 
3. Waiver of Respondent's Rights. 
Petitioner argues that Respondent waived any right to dispose of the body by 
cremation when she agreed to the burial in Utah. Respondent counters that she was not 
aware of Mr. Hughes's wishes until she learned of his note to Petitioner. Petitioner argues 
that Respondent saw the note before the burial, and Respondent argues that she did not. The 
Court finds this to be immaterial. 
Whatever the contents of the note may be, Respondent has not given evidence that the 
note creates a binding, enforceable legal obligation to accomplish a cremation. Regardless 
of when Respondent learned of Mr. Hughes's note to Petitioner, the note does not create a 
legal right in Respondent which she did not already have, if any. The note constitutes simply 
(i) another expression of Mr. Hughes' s wishes, contrary to his last expression to Respondent, 
and (ii) Respondent's explanation for her change of mind about the burial, which tire Court 
finds to be a good faith explanation.5 Furthermore, considering Mr. Hughes's vacillation as 
Respondent has not explained, however, why she now chooses to believe the note over Mr. 
Hughes's statement to her that he did not mean what he had said in his voice mail, or why she should rely 
to any extent on the statements of a person whose mental condition had obviously deteriorated to the point 
of suicide. 
to his wishes, Respondent cannot say that the purported contents of the note were a clear and 
unequivocal expression of Mr. Hughes's wishes. Consequently, the note is not material to 
the Court's decision. 
The fact remains that Mr. Hughes informed Respondent of his wish to be cremated 
before his death, and Respondent, in apparent good faim, either chose not to believe him or 
chose not to comply with his wishes. Respondent could have chosen to have the body 
cremated in accordance with the wishes Mr. Hughes once expressed to her. Having chosen 
to allow the body to be buried in Utah, instead of being cremated and disposed of in New 
Mexico, Respondent waived any right to choose another form of disposition. Cf. In re Estate 
of Mover. 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978). 
4. Public Policy Regarding Disinterment. 
The case just cited states: "It is therefore a sound and well-established policy of the 
law that a person, once buried, should not be exhumed except for the most compelling of 
reasons." 14. at 110-111. This Court does not read the new provisions of the Funeral 
Services Licensing Act to change that policy, since the Act only establishes the priorities of 
persons who may chose the method of disposition of a body. 
The Mover case was preceded by Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission. 115 Utah 336, 204 P.2d 811 (Utah 1949), in which the Utah Supreme Court 
quoted with approval the following policy language from a Corpus Juris Secondum article: 
There is a distinction between the rights existing prior to burial and those after 
burial, because after its interment the body is in the custody of the law and a 
disturbance of its resting place and its removal is subject to the control and 
direction of a court of equity in any case properly before it It is the policy of 
the law, except in cases of necessity or for laudable purposes, that the sanctity 
of the grave should be maintained, and that a body once suitably buried should 
remain undisturbed; and a court will not ordinarily order or permit a body to 
be disinterred unless there is a strong showing that it is necessary and that the 
interests of justice require it However, there is no universal rule applicable, 
each case depending on its own facts and circumstances; and for a valid 
reason, upon application by a proper person, the removal of a body will be 
permitted. 
Id at 813 (emphasis added). 
The Mover case was relied upon by the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Spanich v. 
Reichelderfer. 628 N.E. 2d 102 (Ohio App. 1993), and that court's expression of the reasons 
for the policy restricting disinterments is powerfully persuasive on this issue. The opinion 
examines the several factors which courts have considered with respect to requests for 
disinterment of bodies, and this Court has considered those factors in relation to this case and 
finds them generally to support Petitioner's arguments. For example, the Court has 
considered the following: 
a. While Respondent had the closest legal relationship to Mr. Hughes, it is 
suggested (without contradiction) that they were separated at the time of his death, so her 
personal interest is weaker than it might have been. 
b. Petitioner's relationship to Mr. Hughes is the closest recognized in the law, 
except that of a surviving spouse. 
c. Mr. Hughes's expressions of his wishes were contradictory at best, and his 
mental condition was not good at the time, so his trae wishes cannot be determined with any 
certainty. 
d. Respondent consented to the burial in Utah, and her suggestion that she was 
under pressure from Petitioner is not supported by evidence before the Court. 
e. Respondent acknowledges that she cannot fully comply with what she 
considers Mr. Hughes's wishes even if the body is disinterred and cremated, because laws 
governing the Rio Grande River would prevent her from spreading the ashes there. 
Ultimately, this Court is not persuaded that Respondent has identified any compelling 
reason to order Mr. Hughes's body disinterred. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no genuine issue of material fact, and Petitioner is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is granted and Respondent's 
motion for summary judgment is denied. Accordingly, a permanent injunction shall be 
issued, enjoining the disinterment of the body. Petitioners counsel is hereby directed to 
submit an appropriate judgment and permanent injunction pursuant to Rule 4-504. A copy 
of this Ruling shall be attached to the judgment and incorporated therein by reference. 
Dated this ^ S> day of October, 2003. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
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